"Women, Like Men, but Cheaper"
This dependence wasn't unique to Christian Europe, but it also wasn't universal. On property and money, historically, Islamic law was actually ahead of the West by over a thousand years. Classical Islamic law gave married women an independent legal and financial personality from early Islam onward, a wife's property and earnings were legally hers alone, the husband had no claim on her wealth, and she kept her mahr (the money or property paid to her at marriage) as personal property. Western coverture law did the opposite: a married woman's property, wages, and legal identity were absorbed into her husband's, and that didn't start reversing until the Married Women's Property Acts of the late 1800s in the UK and US.
hat advantage on property didn't carry over everywhere, though. On work, mobility, and guardianship, Islamic law varied enormously by country and era, and some restrictions lasted longer than in the West. Tunisia's 1956 Code of Personal Status was genuinely progressive for the region (banned polygamy, ended a wife's legal "obligation of obedience"), though the explicit right to work and bank without a husband's permission came through later reforms, not the 1956 Code itself. At the other end, Saudi Arabia's male guardianship system required a woman to have a male relative's permission to travel until 2019, and working or opening certain accounts was similarly gated through guardianship.
Put these pieces side by side and a clearer picture emerges: women's economic dependence on men propagated through economic, civil, and religious institutions alike, although it cannot be denied that it oppressed differently depending on the country, and it was not a rule that Islam equaled oppression while western Christianism equaled freedom.
Whatever the religious or legal starting point, capitalism inherited this dependence and adapted it efficiently: men tied to wages, women tied to men. Work done inside the home stayed invisible and unpaid, while work done outside it got undervalued simply because a woman was doing it. During industrialization, this had a name, almost a business case: women were hired because they were "like men, but cheaper", just as productive, paid less. At the same time, employers called women unreliable, because women were the ones expected to drop everything for a sick kid or an aging parent. Paid work undervalued, unpaid work assumed, that double force still runs most of the world. It shows up in strange places too: J.K. Rowling and E.L. James published under initials, not because they wanted to, but because a male-coded name still opens doors a female one doesn't. And none of these lands the same way for every woman: race, class, disability, and sexuality stack different weights on top of the same basic structure.
Here's where socialism, actually broke something: it refused to treat women's place in the workforce as optional. Female labor participation across the Soviet bloc sat around 40–50%, compared to roughly 30–37% in the US and much of Western Europe at the time. Women became doctors, engineers, scientists, administrators, not because patriarchy magically disappeared (it didn't; the pay gap and the unpaid second shift stuck around), but because the state made dependence structurally harder to maintain. Public-sector jobs tend to enforce equal pay and equal access more consistently than private ones, simply because hiring and wages answer to public rules instead of a boss's discretion.
That link between weak states and dependent women isn't just historical. It shows up right now in the current discourse of rising right-wing populist parties of “making the State more efficient by reducing it to its minimal” and “keeping traditional women’s roles”, since a weak State guarantees less women’s rights implementation. A strong public sector isn't charity, it's an engine that creates jobs while expanding the childcare, healthcare, and education that let people actually use them.
Compare that to how capitalism treats its own failures: calling the private sector efficient while quietly saving it from bankrupt whenever it collapses, or funding private universities through student debt that enriches investors more than it educates anyone. "Efficient" apparently means profitable when things go well and someone else's problem when they don't. Clear examples are the Covid 19 pandemic and the economic crisis it unchained. In Colombia, when the airline Avianca went bankrupt in 2020, the government stepped in with about $370 million in public credit, roughly a fifth of the airline's $2 billion rescue package, while private lenders covered the rest. But the bigger story was in the pandemic payroll support given to businesses across the country: researchers later found that half the workers covered by it worked not at small struggling businesses, but at companies owned by Colombia's richest families. That included hotel and media businesses owned by Sarmiento Angulo, snack and publishing brands owned by Gilinski, a soft drink and broadcasting group owned by Ardila Lülle, and television and cinema chains owned by Santo Domingo. One study found that Colombia gave nearly half of all its pandemic business aid to large companies, more than any other country studied in South America.
Germany told a similar story, just bigger. The airline Lufthansa received a nine billion euro rescue in 2020, and in exchange, the German state became a 20% owner of the company. The tour company TUI received more than four billion euros across several rounds of aid. In both countries, the same pattern repeated: when the market failed, the state stepped in to cover the losses. When the companies recovered, the profits went quietly back to private shareholders, not to the public that had carried the risk.
The lesson from Lufthansa and Avianca is really the same one from the start of this chapter: whoever controls the means of survival controls the people who depend on it. That question is about to repeat itself in a new form. As AI and automation replace more paid labor, the danger isn't liberation, it's deeper concentration, wealth and control pooling upward into whoever owns the machines. A universal basic income, funded through taxation or public enterprise, is one serious answer on the table. Without something like it, the future doesn't flatten inequality between men and women, it just makes everyone equally dependent on whoever owns the technology.
"What to Expect When You Are Expecting Exploitation": On Motherhood
Motherhood gets treated like a private choice, but women are the ones who pay for it, alone. The logic works like this, and it keeps repeating itself: employers think a woman might leave her job once she has children, so they pay her less from the start. Because she's paid less, it "makes sense" that she, not her partner, is the one who quits when a child comes. Discrimination creates itself and then calls itself natural. The market will never fix this on its own, there's no profit in fixing it, so the state has to.
It helps to be clear here: sex is biology. Gender is the story society tells about that biology. Gender discrimination happens exactly at the point where a biological difference turns into a social ranking: man is productive and independent; woman is caring, self-sacrificing, and economically second. That ranking isn't natural. People built it, and people keep it going.
Socialist feminists were saying this over a hundred years ago. In 1897, the German feminist Lily Braun proposed state-funded maternity insurance. Her point was simple: having a child shouldn't mean falling into poverty or losing your job. This wasn't a small issue. Industrial workers at the time worked 60 to 65 hours a week with no maternity leave at all, and maternal and infant death rates showed it. Capitalist economies needed children, future workers, future taxpayers, but made individual women carry the entire cost of having them. The Second International, the alliance of socialist and labor parties that pushed for the eight-hour workday and basic worker protections, demanded tax-funded support for mothers as a normal part of their program. A lot of what we now think of as "normal", paid leave, labor protections, social insurance, started out as a socialist demand, not something given freely.
Where these ideas were actually put into practice, the results were real. Sweden guaranteed 180 days of job-protected leave at 80% of salary by 1963. Bulgaria gave free university education to students who completed national service, so a woman could study and raise a child at the same time instead of choosing between them. East Germany went even further, building housing for mothers and children at universities, so students could raise a baby and keep studying at the same time. By 1989, about a third of births in East Germany happened outside marriage, far more than in the West, and importantly, that did not mean poverty, because childcare and housing support didn't depend on having a husband. That's the important part: a woman shouldn't need to stay in a relationship just to have a place to live.
None of this was simple or purely good. The Soviet Union legalized abortion on demand in 1920, the first country in Europe to do so, only to take much of that back under Stalin in 1936, for reasons tied to growing the population. Across socialist countries, childbearing was often controlled by the state, sometimes in ways that helped women, sometimes in ways that controlled them. But some of these states also pushed, as early as the 1950s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, for fathers to actually share housework and childcare, recognizing decades before it became a common feminist point that equality can't exist if women are still doing two full jobs, one paid, one not.
When the Soviet bloc collapsed, privatization tore this system down fast. Childcare centers closed, unemployment went up, and the cost of raising children went quietly back onto individual families. Birth rates in East Germany fell sharply after reunification, not because women stopped wanting children, but because the conditions that made having children manageable disappeared. And in an interesting twist, East German women then changed things in the West: when they moved there after 1989, they expected something West German women had never had, that the state, not just the mother, should help carry the weight of raising a child. They pushed for daycare and kindergartens because they had never lived without them.
This is also why maternity leave can't be left up to individual companies to decide on their own. No company wants to be known for offering the most generous parental leave, because it just attracts the workers most likely to use it, and that looks like an extra cost to the company. But when every employer is legally required to offer the same protections, and the state shares the cost, no woman gets punished for being pregnant at the wrong company. Paid leave, free childcare, job protection, these were never extra comforts. They were tools built specifically to take away men's control over women's work, bodies, and survival. Much of today's resistance to these policies is, underneath, really just resistance to losing that control.

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